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Therapeutic Reproduction
and Human Dignity
Richard F. Storrow*
Abstract. The article explores current controversies in therapeutic reproduction through the lens of two
contemporary novels as well as with the aid of ethics pronouncements made by the American Society
for Reproductive Medicine and the European Society for Human Reproduction and Embryology.
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INTRODUCTION
Bioethicists have long embraced literature as a valuable tool for analysis.'
Their interest in literary narratives is unsurprising. Advances in biotech-
nology present questions of who we are as individuals and who we are as a
species,' questions to which the humanities have offered responses for millen-
nia.3 As part of a larger "narrative practice of bioethics," the study of fiction
can be transformative in addressing not only existing bioethical dilemmas but
also ones that yet remain in the realm of speculation.4
A body of literature is now emerging in response to specific controversies
in bioethics, including those triggered by the intersection of reproduction-
assisting technologies and the crisis in human organ donation.5 Two recent
novels in this vein wrestle with the ethics of using reproductive technology
to create donors of human tissue and organs. In Jodi Picoult's My Sister's
Keeper, set in the United States, Brian and Sara Fitzgerald use reproductive
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technology to conceive a child to serve as a donor for their leukemia-stricken
daughter Kate.6 For years Anna submits to increasingly aggressive medical
interventions in order to donate tissues for Kate's care. When she is asked as
a teenager to donate a kidney to Kate, Anna responds by suing for medical
emancipation from her parents. The backdrop of Kazuo Ishiguro's Never Let
Me Go is a governmental program that pursues cures for cancer and heart
disease with organs extracted from a stable of human clones.7 The novel is
the story of Kathy H., a clone who relates what it was like to grow up in an
institution established under this program and how she and a fellow inmate
eventually confronted an official whose efforts to make the program more
humane had failed.
At first blush, My Sister's Keeper and Never Let Me Go appear to have little
in common. My Sister's Keeper examines a technology that is currently avail-
able, while Never Let Me Go speculates about a use to which technology might
be put in the future. My Sister's Keeper is the story of an individual family's
struggle to save their dying daughter. Never Let Me Go is the story of an entire
society that, in the name of public health, requires one class of people to sur-
render their lives for the benefit of others. Finally, the highest accolade for My
Sister's Keeper, as long on melodrama as Picoult's other best-sellers, has been
its great popularity. By contrast, Never Let Me Go made the short list for the
Mann-Booker prize in 2005 and has otherwise been on several "best books"
lists.
Despite their dissimilarities, the Library of Congress classifies both My
Sister's Keeper and Never Let Me Go as its only works of fiction having to do
with human organ donors. This is significant, for it is the donors' perspectives
in these novels that raise important questions about the lengths to which fami-
lies and society should go to heal those stricken by disease. Reading the novels
together reveals remarkable parallels between the deference paid to parents in
matters of reproduction and child rearing and to government in its pursuit of
public health aims. Such deference has the effect of obscuring if not necessar-
ily illegitimizing what could be more critically searching evaluations of paren-
tal or governmental attempts to instrumentalize human reproduction.
Beyond these more general themes, both My Sister's Keeper and Never Let
Me Go ask us to reconsider debates about the specific bioethical questions they
raise. These debates have taken very different paths. Policymakers and ethicists
tend to describe a couple's choice to conceive and raise a "savior sibling" as an
act of love and responsible parenting but have reviled reproductive cloning as
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an affront to human dignity, both because of the repugnance it engenders and
because human clones lack a connection to two genetic parents. Some of these
same policymakers have hailed cloning embryos for the purpose of stem cell
research and therapy as positive and humanitarian. Britain has embraced both
of these positions by most recently enacting a law that permits the creation of
savior siblings under certain conditions.8 In a former parliamentary session,
Britain outlawed human reproductive cloning but permitted cloning human
embryos for stem cell research.9
My Sister's Keeper and NeverLet Me Go successfully problematize the bright
lines drawn between ethically permissible and ethically impermissible uses of
reproductive technology. First, they call into question dichotomies between
reproduction and therapy and between family and state that have permitted
easy distinction between what is good and what is bad about reproductive
technology. These dichotomies project parents as proper consumers of exist-
ing technology that helps them achieve their reproductive aims and govern-
ment as a proper promoter of technology aimed at curing dreaded diseases.
The novels suggest that it is misguided to conceive of parental and govern-
mental competencies as inhabiting wholly separate spheres. They caution that
what we fail to appreciate in holding to these dichotomies is that reproduction
and therapy are not distinct but that both parents and the state in their suppos-
edly separate spheres are capable of harnessing reproductive power to create
children for the therapy of others.
Second, the novels reveal the concept of human dignity to be insufficiently
definite to be used for accurate line drawing in these ethical controversies.
Certainly if human clones have no dignity because of their biological origins,
as the stance against human reproductive cloning holds, their creation for
humanitarian therapeutic ends is difficult to classify as an antihumanitarian
crime. On the other hand, if the biological origins of human clones do not pre-
determine their potential for personhood, as Never Let Me Go demonstrates,
why should the law prohibit their creation? With regard to savior siblings, the
appeal to dignity is similarly tenuous because it rests on slender assumptions
about parental motivations and devotion as well on speculations about a do-
nor sibling's psychology that My Sister's Keeper quite easily calls into doubt.
By exploring the human struggle and emotions that come into play when we
employ the power of human reproduction to solve difficult medical problems,
Picoult and Ishiguro implore us not to be satisfied with the ease and certainty
that have to date characterized ethical pronouncements in this area.
Law & Literature * Volume 21, Number 2
SAVIOR SIBLINGS
For many years, it has been possible to determine the health of a pregnant
woman's fetus with the aid of prenatal genetic diagnosis." At times, parents
will elect to abort a fetus they discover has severe abnormalities. With the
development of tools for preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), it has be-
come possible, in combination with in vitro fertilization, to test embryos for
genetic and chromosomal defects so as to avoid commencing a pregnancy
that would later require termination. The same technology, in combination
with human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue profiling, permits parents with a
sick child who could benefit from donations of tissue to select an embryo that
will develop into a compatible donor. Prior to the advent of PGD and HLA
typing, parents with sick children were limited to testing fetuses in utero and
aborting those whose tissues would be unsuitable for therapy," a practice that
generated consternation among some commentators.'2 Since PGD and HLA
are effective, it is felt ethically preferable to proceed in that manner, the bur-
den on embryos and parents being less acute.
Parents planning to create a savior sibling intend that the child will donate
umbilical cord blood, regenerative tissue such as bone marrow, and, poten-
tially, a nonregenerating organ to promote the health of the sick sibling. 3 The
savior sibling herself may be, but is not always, medically benefited by the
PGD. In the case of an inherited disease, PGD can ensure that the savior child
will not have the disease. The medical benefits for the donee include not only
the therapy itself but also circumventing the perennial shortage of human tis-
sue available for transplant and avoiding the risk that the donee's body will
reject the transplant. 4
Ethics Pronouncements
There is diversity of opinion on the ethics of creating savior siblings, and the
analysis of the question shares some characteristics with ethics pronounce-
ments on sex selection for social reasons. As one might expect, physicians'
associations disagree about whether sex selection is ethical "when it is aimed
at serving social and psychological goals not related to the prevention of
disease."' 5 Although both the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM) and the European Society for Human Reproduction and Embryol-
ogy (ESHRE) believe sex selection for the purposes of disease prevention is
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ethical,'16 ASRM rejects using PGD for sex selection for nonmedical reasons,"
and constituents of ESHRE's Ethics Task Force have expressed two posi-
tions-(i) PGD and sex selection for nonmedical reasons are always unac-
ceptable and (2) PGD and sex selection for nonmedical reasons are acceptable
to "balance" the genders of the children in a family. 8 Under the latter view,
it would be unethical to select the gender of a first child. As long as sperm-
sorting techniques are safe, ASRM does approve of preconception sex selec-
tion for family balancing or for first children because it imposes fewer burdens
on embryos and parents. 9
The rationales offered for labeling sex selection for nonmedical purposes
as ethical or unethical are many and include fears about sex bias and societal
gender imbalances. 2 More relevant to the present discussion are the concerns
that nonmedical sex selection trivializes reproduction, instrumentalizes off-
spring, and presents too great a risk of psychological and emotional harm to
the children. 21 In essence, these are fears that, in selecting the genetic profiles
of their children, parents take the wrong approach to reproduction. The belief
is that the expectations parents will generate in wielding such control over the
reproductive process will have negative psychological and emotional ramifi-
cations for their children.
The same concerns underlie discussion of the ethics of creating savior sib-
lings. 22 ESHRE articulates both ethical and legal justifications in favor of their
creation. ESHRE's legal opinion draws support from the presumption that
parents will act in the best interests of their children. ESHRE believes that the
presumption encompasses the determination of fully informed and counseled
parents to impose a detriment upon their child for the benefit of his sibling, at
least where they judge that the "risks are outweighed by the benefits for the
receiving sibling. 23 From this reasoning, ESHRE fashions a "postnatal test"
for savior siblings: "If the parents have the authority to 'volunteer' an existing
child as a bone marrow donor for a sibling, it is also acceptable that they create
a child as a bone marrow donor for a sibling. 24 The condition embodied in the
postnatal test reflects the fact that the law sets a higher standard for parental
decision making when the medical procedure is of no direct medical benefit to
the donor child.25 ESHRE and commentators have suggested that this higher
standard can be met through the psychological benefits the donor receives
from helping the sick sibling, benefits that range from contributing to the fam-
ily's stability and survival to the boost in self-esteem gained from having a
power to heal that others lack.26 ESHRE's second legal argument in support
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of the creation of savior siblings is that a court may substitute its judgment
for that of the unconceived donor in the same way it does when considering
whether medical procedures should be performed upon persons too incapaci-
tated to give informed consent.27 In the context of savior siblings, ESHRE
anticipates that a court will conclude that "the future sibling on whose behalf
the decision to donate is made will agree with the present decision when he/
she becomes autonomous."' Despite its generally favorable attitude toward
the creation of savior siblings, ESHRE cautions that creating a child to donate
nonregenerating organs is unacceptable "in view of the risks involved for the
donor child."29
As an ethical response to fears that savior siblings will not enjoy "full re-
spect for their personal uniqueness and dignity,"' ESHRE believes using
PGD for HLA matching is not instrumentalizing if obtaining tissue is not the
only motive for the parents to have the child. As long as the parents intend to
love and care for the donor child to the same extent as they love and care for
the affected child, they can clear this "single-motive" hurdle3' and avert psy-
chological and emotional harm to the donor offspring. This ethical analysis is
similar to ASRM's position that preconception gender selection is acceptable
where parents are counseled against unrealistic expectations and "affirm that
they will fully accept children of the opposite sex if the preconception gender
selection fails. 32
Commentators on the single-motive test emphasize how extremely difficult
it would be to show that parents harbor a single motive for creating a savior
sibling. 3 Indeed, especially when parents undertake Herculean efforts to save
their sick child, it perhaps is highly unlikely that they will treat their carefully
chosen donor child with any less devotion,34 especially if the donations suc-
cessfully treat the sick child.35 In that case, the donor may actually receive an
emotional boost from having been of such great assistance." The thrust of
these perspectives is that without red flags to warn us that parents will abuse,
neglect, or abandon their donor children, we lack justification for assuming
anything other than that a parental project to create a child to save another
falls well within the sphere of deference parents have traditionally enjoyed.37
Of course, not every ethical analysis proceeds in the direction of general
permissiveness. Convened by former President Bush in 2001, the Presi-
dent's Council on Bioethics took a very firm stance against sex selection
for nonmedical reasons and expressed a number of concerns about the cre-
ation of savior siblings. The Council was particularly concerned that when
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technology removes the "genetic lottery" from human reproduction, parental
expectations become fixed in ways that deprive the resulting children of an
"open future."38 In the case of nonmedical sex selection, the Council adopted
reasoning from its earlier work opposing human reproductive cloning and
stated: "[W]e should be reluctant to see ourselves as people who may appro-
priately dictate such a crucial part of the identity of our child [lest we turn
human reproduction] into a form of manufacture and open the door to a new
eugenics."39 The Council disagreed that counseling and a parental affirma-
tion that a child of the undesired gender will be fully accepted pull the poison
from sex selection." Similarly, the President's Council did not dispute that
savior siblings are probably loved by their parents but nonetheless queried
whether assigning the role of savior to a child as a condition for its existence
is an appropriate exercise of human reproductive potential.4 In essence, the
President's Council viewed the creation of savior siblings as a genetic trait
selection technology that goes beyond therapy.42 Unlike ESHRE and ASRM,
then, the President's Council believed these technologies to threaten impor-
tant understandings of human reproduction and even of human dignity.
My Sister's Keeper
Running through much of the ethical analysis on savior siblings is not only
the idea that parents should be permitted to resort to desperate measures to
save the life of their child but that within individual families there are special
moral bonds that require extraordinary sacrifices where there is "a substan-
tial family need."43 In addition, ethics commentators remain committed to the
idea that parents intend to love and care for their donor children or can be
educated to do so." Jodi Picoult's My Sister's Keeper weaves a story that impli-
cates and problematizes these perspectives. Even more significantly, her tale
compels us to consider what ramifications broad deference to families facing
medical crises carries for governmental initiatives to address serious public
health problems.
In My Sister's Keeper, Anna Fitzgerald is a savior sibling who has donated
cord blood, white blood cells, and bone marrow to her leukemia-stricken
sister Kate. When she is thirteen and her parents, Sara and Brian, ask her to
give up her kidney to save her dying sister, she instead sues for medical eman-
cipation. Since the discovery of Kate's illness, the energies and resources of
this family have gone largely to prolonging her life. Anna understands why
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she was created and what is expected of her. 5 But after years of invasive and
painful medical treatments of no benefit to herself, Anna wants to forge an
identity that is not defined in terms of treating her sister's illness.
There is no question that an important part of what drives Picoult's story is
its melodrama and overwrought metaphors.' Kate's continual relapses ensure
that a family crisis develops every few pages. An extended metaphor finds
the firefighter husband describing his family as a house fire out of control47
and the neglected older son, Jesse, turning to arson. But in addition to these
trappings of popular fiction, Picoult skillfully employs a multiple first-person,
present-tense narration that enhances the immediacy of the story and thus
the reader's sense of its veracity. This structure also effectively exposes the
rarely glimpsed complexity of family dynamics and in this way helps put meat
on the bones of the pared-down ethical analysis discussed above. Central to
this project is the character of the guardian ad litem, Julia, who must mediate
between the family and the legal establishment. Julia's greatest contribution
to our ethical understanding of creating savior siblings is the reminder, com-
pletely absent from the ethical pronouncements on this issue, that families
who create savior siblings remain in crisis long after the savior's birth. The
fraught Fitzgeralds certainly pass the anemic "one-motive" test, but barely. In
particular, Sara fails at nearly every opportunity to describe or relate to Anna
in any way other than what she means for the life and health of her sister.4 In
this way, her love and care for Anna seem precariously contingent. Her rage
at Anna's assertion of autonomy,49 however, does not signal bad mothering; it
is symptomatic of the sick child's overwhelming influence on everything that
takes place in the life of this family. Brian and Sara simply have no resources
left with which to attend to their other children as autonomous individuals.
Picoult's tale not only problematizes pithy ethics pronouncements; it also
leads us to consider what insulating families from interference, when they try
to resolve difficult health issues, suggests about the lengths government might
go to do the same. If we feel it is justifiable for a family to call upon or create
its members to make extraordinary sacrifices in order to preserve the family's
integrity and interests, we have strong analogical support for government to
address a serious public health crisis through extraordinary measures, includ-
ing, perhaps, the harnessing of reproductive potential.'
Harnessing reproductive potential to address a public health crisis is admit-
tedly more concerning than, for example, requiring inoculations against ram-
pant disease. Although in the past the justification for inoculations has been
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raised in support of a government program to sterilize "mental defectives,"'"
more recently concern about the human rights trodden upon by government's
manipulation of procreation has succeeded in undermining its authority to
pursue its aims by those means. 52 In Never Let Me Go, the subject of the next
section, Kazuo Ishiguro imagines a world in which the products of cloning
technology are not considered human and thus, like other chattels, are ap-
propriate targets for instrumentalist regulation. This sounds like the premise
of a dystopic reflection on the abuse of power, but if we take a close look at
the ethical pronouncements responding to human reproductive cloning and
cloning for stem cell research we find abundant language that tends inexora-
bly in the direction of the world that Ishiguro imagines in the Britain of just
yesterday.
HUMAN CLONING FOR ORGAN BANKING
In contrast to the differing opinions about the ethics of nonmedical sex se-
lection and savior siblings, international disapproval of human reproductive
cloning has surged, with statutory bans currently ranging from individual
states within the United States all the way up to the United Nations.53 What
most distinguishes discussions of the ethics of human reproductive cloning
at the legislative level from the discussion of savior siblings by ethics bodies
is the absence of any sense that families should receive deference in choosing
to produce cloned offspring. Instead, the most powerful engine driving the
disapproval of human reproductive cloning is that it poses too great a threat
to human dignity.54 This concern takes several forms, from the fear that clones
would be mere genetic copies lacking in individuality to the fear that rogue
physicians will clone individuals without proper permission.55 In addition, the
humanity of clones themselves might be easy to discount, leading to all sorts
of harm, including such "unrealistic" and "esoteric" applications as the cre-
ation of human organ factories.56
Ethics Pronouncements
Some of the ethics bodies described in the section on savior siblings have is-
sued pronouncements about human reproductive cloning. As ESHRE does
in its opinion on sex selection for family balancing, ASRM outlines the pros
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and cons of human reproductive cloning and ultimately concludes that it is
an unethical practice in the absence of greater assurances of its safety and a
more complete airing of the ethical concerns it raises.57 Arguments in favor
of cloning take the position that it is a suitable reproductive option for the
infertile.58 Arguments against posit that human cloning deprives reproduc-
tion of its mystery and sanctity and devalues the genetic distinctiveness of
each individual.59 These arguments are echoes of the view that nonmedical
sex selection and the creation of savior siblings trivialize and instrumentalize
reproduction. Another common fear is that parents and society would harbor
undue expectations about their cloned children that would cause them to suf-
fer psychological and emotional harm."
Like the legislative bodies mentioned above, the President's Council on
Bioethics believed human reproductive cloning threatens human dignity. It
saw dignity in reproduction as dependent upon a certain way of coming into
existence:
[C]ertain applications of embryo manipulation and assisted reproductive tech-
niques could deny to children born with their aid a full and equal share in our
common human origins, for instance by denying them the natural connection
to two human genetic parents or by giving them a fetal or embryonic progeni-
tor. We believe that such departures and inequities in human origins should
not be inflicted on any child. We therefore recommend that, in an effort to se-
cure for children born with the help of ARTs the same rights and human at-
tachments naturally available to children conceived in vivo, Congress should:
Prohibit attempts to conceive a child by any means other than the union of egg
and sperm.6
This statement might reasonably be interpreted as similar in substance to
the ASRM's enumeration of arguments against cloning. It might mean, for
example, that it would be undignified to permit forms of reproduction that
expose offspring to psychologically harmful exclusion or discrimination. It
might also mean that it is an indignity to trivialize human procreation with
a form of reproduction that lacks a genetic lottery. To do so might be said to
instrumentalize reproduction by commodifying offspring.
Beyond these consistencies with the ASRM's concerns, however, the Pres-
ident's Council's statement might also mean that, lacking two genetic par-
ents, human clones simply are not fully human. If so, the message resonates
with recent arguments for allowing scientists to create stem cells by means of
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research cloning. Faced with opposition to this research grounded in deeply
held convictions about the moral status of human embryos, scientists are now
developing technological and linguistic means for alleviating these concerns.
On the one hand, scientists want to explore a cloning technique for creating
embryos that are incapable of implanting in a uterus and gestating to term.62
On the other, based on the lack of success scientists have experienced in at-
tempting to gestate cloned primate embryos to term, scientists want to charac-
terize cloned human embryos as unconnected with the rest of humanity:
[T]he nature of an embryo seems best understood by reference to its very spe-
cial teleological trajectory. An embryo reflects an evolutionary history com-
prised of a unique genetic lineage through countless generations. It also reflects
a developmental future to be connected to the maternal body. If our analysis is
correct, then cloned human blastocysts lack this teleological trajectory. They
lack predecessors in evolution .... .
Given that cloned human embryos lack a human teleological trajectory, the
authors conclude it would be a mistake to refer to them as embryos or blasto-
cysts and instead suggest the term "clonotes." 4 It is hoped that this change in
nomenclature will better convey the idea that cloned human embryos cannot
become human beings and thus will help defeat moral objections to support-
ing stem cell research with cloning technology.
Never Let Me Go
Recent ethical analysis of human reproductive cloning and cloning for stem
cell research casts both cloned embryos and clones as not fully human. In
Never Let Me Go, Kazuo Ishiguro makes use of these perspectives to imagine
a governmental program wherein human clones are created, husbanded, and
killed for the use of their vital organs in medical treatment. Through the use
of the memoir form, behind which the contours of the organ banking pro-
gram are gradually revealed, Ishiguro provides a sound basis for rejecting the
position that human clones lack dignity.
Kathy H., the author of this memoir is a human clone approaching the
point in her life when she will give up her vital organs and die. Her memoir is
a reflection on the entire sweep of her life, recalled in three stages--childhood,
adolescence, and adulthood. She remembers Hailsham, the boarding school
where she spent her childhood, and the friends and teachers she had there. She
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remembers her adolescence and her confused reaction to her emerging sexual-
ity. She reveals how, in adulthood, she has become aware of how deliberately
sheltered the students of Hailsham were from the outside world and how they
were deprived of any knowledge of their function in it. She explains how, in
adulthood, the illusion she and others held in adolescence that a true romantic
love between two students might entitle them to a temporary reprieve from
their forced donations was exposed as an unfounded rumor. Kathy never rails
against the fact that she was created to fulfill a function that severely limits
her circumstances and opportunities. Her memoir is thus a thoughtful and
resigned look back upon her life by one who accepts that death is near.
Although the organ banking program is the backdrop of this story, as
Kathy enters adulthood she, as a carer for clones who are undergoing organ
removal, becomes more directly involved in its workings. What begins to be
confirmed at this stage is that Hailsham was one of the "privileged estates"6 in
which human organ donors received a level of care and range of opportunities
superior to those afforded clones raised in other institutions under appalling
conditions. Hailsham was an experiment established by those in the political
establishment who wanted the clones to be treated as humanely as possible
and indeed who desired to demonstrate the clones' humanity to the world
at large. The effort ultimately fails for lack of political support. Hailsham is
closed, and the director whose career was devoted to the clones' well being
retires in dejection.
Despite its gruesome premise, Never Let Me Go does not read as a cau-
tionary tale or dystopia. Unlike Picoult, Ishiguro very carefully regulates the
dramatic tension in this story. The idea of human cloning for organ bank-
ing is never exploited for shock value. Unlike many cloning tales, Ishiguro's
eschews power-hungry physicians, money-crazed titans of commerce, and
other conventions of the genre. That the narrator's thoughts, memories, and
reflections remain squarely in the foreground makes Never Let Me Go not a
complete stylistic departure for Ishiguro. Ishiguro has specifically described
his novels prior to The Unconsoled as employing "a method where somebody
look[s] back over his or her life in old age,"66 and we sense that Ishiguro has
returned in Never Let Me Go to a project conveying "the viewpoint of some-
one looking back and ordering his experience... ."7 What distinguishes Never
Let Me Go from A Pale View of Hills, An Artist of the Floating World, and
The Remains of the Day is that it does not attempt as those novels do to be
historically accurate. Ishiguro himself believes the historical accuracy of his
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early works distracts readers from thinking deeply about "abstract themes,
the emotional story."' 6 Nonetheless, Never Let Me Go possesses more simi-
larities with Ishiguro's early novels than to The Unconsoled, which "draws on
slippages in time and place as well as the voices of memory. '69 Never Let Me
Go is not set "in a world that is so odd, so obviously constructed according
to another set of priorities."7 Indeed, apart from the organ banking program
itself, the atmosphere Ishiguro imagines in late 1990s Britain is entirely famil-
iar. Further linking Never Let Me Go with Ishiguro's earlier works is his story-
telling through dreams, the imagination, and distances. Like Ishiguro's other
novels, Never Let Me Go is "pervaded by memory, the reverie of individuals
trying heroically to comprehend their place in the world."'" It is a coming of
age, reaching maturity, and reflecting upon "the remains of childhood and
youth,"72 and of loss which takes the form of reminders of the way things
used to be.73
Even if it is not Ishiguro's project in Never Let Me Go to warn us about how
relaxing our vigilance can result in governmental power running roughshod
over human rights, he nonetheless skillfully forces us to confront the undeni-
able humanity of human clones. The narration is replete with mundane remi-
niscences about disagreements with friends and favorite teachers and more
philosophical ones about the joys of childhood, the angst of adolescence, and
devotion to loved ones through thick and thin. Most poignantly, the clones
begin to wonder about their "model," the one from whom they have received
their genetic inheritance. Indeed, their curiosity "kept growing and growing
over the years until it came to dominate our lives."74 This burning curiosity is
an echo of the quest for genetic progenitors by adoptive children and children
born of third-party gamete donation or third-party gestation in assisted repro-
duction that has become such a prominent part of the debate over the ethics of
reproductive technology. It has been posited in this debate that it is a human
right for everyone to have access to information about their genetic origins be-
cause this fundamental part of our ongoing quest for identity is something that
defines us as human. Ishiguro punctuates this poignancy by making the clones
separate from society in such a way that they begin to question their humanity.
The suggestion is even made among them that they were not created from hu-
man beings who lived normal lives but from societal rejects such as convicts and
prostitutes. They are not only raised in institutions that separate them from the
outside world, but, when they emerge more and more into the outside world,
they seem always to be on the periphery. What the outside world does not see is
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that they act and do things in the same way we all do: they listen to music, they
gossip, they play sports, they have arguments. They pass as humans and in the
very act of passing are terrified that they will be discovered and rejected as not
qualifying as human in some unarticulated but essential way.
In sum, Never Let Me Go is a natural outgrowth of the familiar terms un-
derlying vehement opposition to human reproductive cloning, terms that also
have found their way into arguments in favor of human cloning for stem cell
research. Embracing Kathy's story forces us to conclude that human clones
are every bit as human as the rest of us if only because their lives are likewise
defined by love and loss and hope. If human dignity is indeed that special
quality that makes us more than beasts yet less than gods,75 then Kathy's mem-
oir demonstrates that even those who have a genetic inheritance from a single
person possess it in equal degree.
CONCLUSION
Jodi Picoult's My Sister's Keeper and Kazuo Ishiguro's Never Let Me Go effec-
tively complicate the prevailing ethical views on creating savior siblings and
human cloning that offer tidy resolution of the pressing questions emerging
from the actual and potential uses of these technologies. My Sister's Keeper
calls into question the assumptions underlying the idea that parents and fami-
lies deserve great deference when they decide to create a child to save another.
Whereas ethics pronouncements present the creation of a savior sibling as
a way to resolve a familial crisis, My Sister's Keeper demonstrates how the
savior's presence can actually intensify the crisis. The presentation of the do-
nor's perspective alongside her parents', an element barely referenced in eth-
ics reports, destabilizes pithy pronouncements about unconditional love and
the ease of educating parents to exhibit equanimity when their projects do
not proceed as planned. Never Let Me Go presents the ramifications of similar
deference for a government pursuing important public health objectives. By
revealing the details of the organ donation program within the story of a hu-
man clone whose life has been defined by love and loss and hope, the novel
cautions us that, if human clones are ever born, any move to classify them as
lacking essential elements of personhood will be dishonest.
While Ishiguro treats a technology all agree is not yet feasible, Picoult pro-
pels her story forward with an account of a technology used on a daily basis
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in the infertility industry. Whereas Picoult's story unfolds within the familiar
confines of a suburban family struggling with everyday disappointments and
frustrations, Ishiguro's takes place in an eerily unfamiliar institution created
for raising compliant human organ donors. Upon closer examination, any
significant dissimilarity between these two novels dissolves in their tackling
of the profound question of whether it is morally permissible to create human
beings for the purpose of treating the illnesses of others.
In addressing this question, both novels counsel against ill-considered poli-
cymaking at the intersection of reproductive technology and human tissue
and organ donation. In particular, the novels question whether human dig-
nity, so frequently invoked in this area of bioethical debate, is a stable enough
concept upon which to ground regulation or whether it instead is sufficiently
manipulable to permit our worst fears and unwarranted assumptions to take
the form of reactionary legislation. Reading Picoult alongside Ishiguro ad-
vances ongoing debates about whether the products of human reproductive
ingenuity should become new tools in the fight against dreaded diseases by
asking what we as a society will sacrifice if they do.
• Professor of Law, City University of New York. Many thanks to Caitlin De Sa for her superior
research assistance.
i. See, e.g., Stories and TheirLimits: Narrative Approaches to Bioethics, ed. Hilde Lindemann Nelson (New
York: Routledge, 1997), 89-149.
2. See Myriam Sommer, "Avant- Propos," in Des Enfants Comme Les Autres? La Santd, le Droit et le
Bien-Etre des Enfants Nis de l'Assistance Midicale d la Procr'ation (Paris: John Libby Eurotext,
1996).
3. See Being Human: Core Readings in the Humanities, ed. L. Kass (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), xi,
xxi.
4. Rita Charon & Martha Montello, eds., Stories Matter: The Role of Narrative in Medical Ethics (New
York: Routledge, 2002), vii; see also Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness
(New York: Oxford, 2oo6), x.
j. See Martha Montello, "Novel Perspectives on Bioethics," Chronicle of Higher Education, May 13, 2005,
at B6. The suggestion that reproductive technology might be a way to address the shortage of human
organs for transplantation therapy is suggested by Tony Waldron, "Sibling Saviours," New Scientist,
Aug. 25, 2007, at 23 (letter to the editor).
6. Jodi Picoult, My Sister's Keeper (New York: Atria, 2004).
7. Kazuo Ishiguro, NeverLet Me Go (New York: Knopf, 2005).
8. Edward White, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill: What Happened? (20o8), 4, available at
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snsc-o 4 886.pdf. Sweden has recently
granted parents a limited right to create savior siblings. See "Three Bioethical Debates in Sweden," 17
Cambridge Quarterly ofHealthcare Ethics 261 (2008).
Law & Literature * Volume 21, Number 2
9. "MPs Back Hybrid Embryo Research," BBC News, May i9, 2oo8, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk.news/politics/7 407589.stm.
jo. Traditional prenatal genetic diagnostic techniques include ultrasound, amniocentesis and chorionic
villi sampling. J. L. Simpson, "PND or PGD: The Place of PGD in Human Medicine" 16 Reproductive
Biomedicine Online S5 (2008) (supp.).
ix. See R v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, [2005] UKHL 28, at [441.
12. See, e.g., Jean Bernard, La Bioithique 23 (Paris: Flammarion, 1994); Robert Boyle & Julian Savulescu,
"Prenatal Diagnosis for 'Minor' Genetic Abnormalities Is Ethical," 3 American Journa of Bioethics
W6o (2oo3).
13. Cord blood can be used to treat children below the weight of 25 kilograms, but older children will
need bone marrow transplantation. See ESHRE Ethics Task Force, "Taskforce 9: The Application of
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Human Leukocyte Antigen Typing of Embryos," 2o Human
Reproduction 845 (2oo5).
14. Bernard M. Dickens, "Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and 'Savior Siblings,"' 88 international]our-
nal ofGynecology and Obstetrics 91 (2005). Adults sometimes donate body parts to their siblings. See
Bernard, supra note 12, at 22. See, e.g., Lisa Ryckman, "Gift of a Lifetime," Rocky Mountain News, July
8, 20o6, at iE. In cases where the prospective donor has insufficient capacity to give informed consent,
a court may approve the donation. See, e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.zd 145 (Ky. j969); Little v. Little,
575 S.W.zd 493 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Sup. 1972).
15. Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, "Sex Selection and Preimplan-
tation Genetic Diagnosis," 72 Fertiliy and Sterility 595, 597 (1999)-
16. See ASRM, "Sex Selection," supra note j5, at 598; ESHRE Ethics Task Force, "Task Force 5: Preim-
plantation Genetic Diagnosis," i8 Human Reproduction 649, 650 (2003). The ethics pronouncements of
these societies are not binding on clinics.
17. See ASRM, "Sex Selection," supra note 15, at 598.
18. ESHRE, "Task Force 5,'" supra note 16, at 65 . "Family balancing" describes the decision of parents
to have a child of a certain gender where they already have a child of the other gender or an unequal
number of both genders. See id.
19. Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, "Preconception Gender Selec-
tion for Nonmedical Reasons," 75 Fertility and Steriliy 861-63 (200).
20. See ESHRE, "Task Force 5," supra note 16, at 651; ASRM, "Preconception Gender Selection," supra
note i9, at 862; ASRM, "Sex Selection," supra note 15, at 595-98.
21. See ESHRE, "Task Force 5," supra note 16, at 65I; ASRM, "Preconception Gender Selection," supra
note 19, at 862; ASRM, "Sex Selection," supra note 15, at 596-97; Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority, Sex Selection: Options for Regulation (2003), quoted in John Harris, Enhancing Evolution'
The Ethical Case for Making Better People 156 (2007).
22. See, e.g., S. Sheldon & S. Wilkinson, "Should Selecting Saviour Siblings Be Banned?" 30 Journal of
MedicalEthics 533-37 (204).
23. ESHRE, "Taskforce 9," supra note 13, at 846; see also ESHRE, "Task Force 5," supra note j6, at 650.
24. ESHRE, "Task Force 5," supra note 16, at 651; see also ESHRE, "Taskforce 9," supra note 13, at 846;
Frangoise Shenfield, "Le Diagnostique pr~implantoire en vue de choisir un enfant sauveur de fratrie,"
33 Gyne'cologie, obstitrique &fertilitd 833 (2005); Guido Pennings, "Saviour Siblings: Using Preimplan-
tation Genetic Diagnosis for Tissue Typing," 1266 International Congress Series 3 11 (2004).
25. See R v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, [2oo5] UKHL 28, at [371-[38].
26. ESHRE, "Taskforce 9," supra note 13, at 846; G. Pennings, "Creating a Child to Save Another: HLA
Matching of Siblings by Means of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis," in Ethical Dilemmas in Repro-
duction, ed. F. Shenfield & C. Sureau (Boca Raton: Parthenon, 2o02), 51, 6o.
27. ESHRE, "Taskforce 9," supra note 13, at 846. The courts in Strunk v. Strunk, Little v. Little, and Hart s.
Brown, supra note 14, applied this doctrine.
272
Storrow - Therapeutic Reproduction and Human Dignity
28. ESHRE, "Taskforce 9," supra note 13, at 846.
29. ESHRE, "Task Force 5," supra note 16, at 651; ESHRE, "Taskforce 9," supra note 13, at 846.
30. G. Burgio & F. Locatelli, "Ethics of Creating Programmed Stem-cell Donors," 356 Lancet 1868
(2oo0).
31. ESHRE, "Task Force 5," supra note 16, at 651; ESHRE, "Taskforce 9," supra note 13, at 846.
32. ASRM, "Preconception Gender Selection," supra note 19, at 863; cf. ESHRE, "Task Force 5," supra
note 16, at 651 (emphasizing need to discuss possibility of misdiagnosis).
33. See Pennings, supra note 26, at 57; cf. Harris, supra note 21, at 156 (commenting on the unlikelihood that
sex-selected offspring are selected solely for their gender).
34. Id. at 58.
35. J. A. Robertson, "Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: The Ethical Debate," 18 Human Re-
production 465, 468 (2003).
36. See Pennings, supra note 26, at 60; G. Pennings & G. de Wert, "Evolving Ethics in Medically Assisted
Reproduction," 9 Human Reproduction Update 397, 402 (2003); D. Steinberg, "Response to 'Special
Section on Children as Organ Donors' (CQ Vol. 13, No. 2)," 14 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare
Ethics 301 (2005); Harris, supra note 21, at 157.
37. See Pennings, supra note 36, at 402; cf. John Robertson, "Embryo Screening for Tissue Matching," 82
Fertility and Sterility 290 (2004).
38. The President's Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of lappiness 67
(2003), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/beyondtherapy/.
39- Id. at 69, 70.
40. Id. at 71.
41. The President's Council on Bioethics, Reproduction and Responsibility: The Regulation of New Biotech-
nologies 96 (2004), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/
index.html.
42. Id. at 103.
43. See Robertson, supra note 35, at 468; see also L. M. Fleck, "Children and Organ Donation: Some Cau-
tionary Remarks," 13 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 161, j62 (2004); W. Glannon & L. F.
Ross, "Do Genetic Relationships Create Moral Obligations in Organ Transplantation?" i1 Cambridge
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 153, 155-56 (2002).
44. See Pennings, supra note 26, at 63; see also Robertson, supra note 37, at 290.
45. See Picoult, supra note 6, at 7-8, 19, 72.
46. Picoult has been accused in the British press of "polluting our shores with 'transatlantic schmaltz."'
Jemima Lewis, "Morality Tales for the Masses," The Sunday Telegraph (London), Apr. 16, 2006, at
18.
47. See Picoult, supra note 6, at 143.
48. See id. at 100, 136, 231 , 269.
49. Sara dismisses Anna's lawsuit as a childish bid for attention. See id. at 58, 145, 179, 18o, 197.
50. See Shaun D. Pattinson, Influencing Traits Before Birth (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 121 ("The use of
cloning to provide organ donors is appealing primarily because of the current shortage of spare organs
for those in need, causing people to die who could be saved by a transplant.").
51. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
52. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
53. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts United Nations Declaration on Human
Cloning by Vote of 84-34-37, U.N. Doc. GA/Jo 333 (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/o005/galo333.doc.htm (listing states that ban reproductive cloning); Kirstin Mat-
thews, "Overview of World Human Cloning Policies," Connexions, Aug. 3, 2007, available at http://
cnx.org/content/m14834/1. j/. By contrast, there is great regulatory variation as regards therapeutic
Law & Literature - Volume 21, Number 2
cloning. See S. Pattinson & T. Caulfield, "Variations and Voids: The Regulation of Human Cloning
Around the World," 5 BMCMedical Ethics 9 (2004).
54. U.N. Doc. GA/1o333, supra note 53; see Being Human, supra note 3, at xii, xx, xxiv, xxv, 567-68.
55. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association, The Ethics of Human
Cloning (1998), 2-3, available at http://ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/369/report 98.pdf.
56. See id. at 3; Franqoise Shenfield, "Human Cloning," 26 Journal of Medical Ethics 222 (2o0o) (book
review).
57. Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, "Human Somatic Cell Nuclear
Transfer," 74 Fertility and Steriliy 873, 875 (2ooo).
$8. See ASRM, "Human Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer," supra note 57, at 874.
59. See id.
6o. See id. at 874-75; see also Franqoise Shenfield, "Cloning: Reproductive, Therapeutic or Not at All?,"
in Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 26, at 89.
61. See Reproduction and Responsibility, supra note 41, at 222.
62. The technique is known as altered nuclear transfer. See I. Hyun & K. Jung, "Human Research Clon-
ing, Embryos, and Embryo-Like Artifacts," Hastings Center Report, Sept.-Oct. 2oo6, at 34, 40.
63. See Hyun & Jung, supra note 62, at 40. Cf. R. Lanza et al., "The Ethical Validity of Using Nuclear
Transfer in Human Transplantation," 28 4 JAM4 3 175, 3178 (zoo0).
64. See Hyun & Jung, supra note 62, at 37. See also Lanza et al., supra note 63, at 3175 (proposing the
substitution of the term "cell replacement through nuclear transfer (CRNT)" for "cloning" when re-
ferring to stem cell research). The term "ovasome" has also been suggested. See Ronald Green, "Five
Ethical Questions for SCNT Stem Cell Research," 9 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
131, 137 (2OO8).
65. Ishiguro, supra note 7, at 4, 30.
66. "Kazuo Ishiguro with Maya Jaggi," in Writing Across Worlds: Contemporary Writers Talk, ed. Susheila
Nasta (Abigdon & New York: Roudedge, 2004), 164.
67. "Kazuo Ishiguro," supra note 66, at 168.
68. "Kazuo Ishiguro," supra note 66, at i6o.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Joyce Carol Oates, Uncensored- Views and (Re)views (New York: Ecco Press, 2o05), 89.
72. Id. at 88.
73. Ishiguro, supra note 7, at 276-77, 286-87.
74. Ishiguro, supra note 7, at 37.
75. Being Human, supra note 3, at xxv.
274
